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Abstract
Spectrum auction has been considered as a promising approach to effectively reallocate spectrum resources in the
secondary spectrum market. In our previous work, spectrum auction in a fractional frequency reuse (FFR) cognitive
cellular system was studied. However, the bidding and valuation model of secondary users (SUs) are not close to
practical applications as they introduced a random value of a fixed scope. In this paper, through an optimal
interference price announced by the primary user (PU), a joint precoding and power allocation algorithm via
Stackelberg game (OIPPS) is proposed to improve the spectrum auction problem subject to the interference
constraint of PU, the transmission power constraint of SUs, and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
constraint of each SU in the FFR cognitive cellular system. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the
proposed OIPPS algorithm in terms of the convergence of precoding and power allocation vectors and the
maximized sum utility of SUs while taking full consideration of the PU’s revenue. Besides, a comparison between
the bidding improved spectrum auction scheme and a traditional method is proposed to show the effectiveness of
our proposed algorithm.
Keywords: Spectrum auction, Precoding and power allocation, FFR, Interference price, Stackelberg game
1 Introduction
With the rapid deployment of cognitive radio (CR)
networks, the precious spectrum resource is becoming
increasingly crowded. Besides, the requirement for radio
spectrum has grown rapidly with the dramatic develop-
ment of the mobile telecommunication industry in the last
decades [1]. So, more efficient resource allocation ways
are urgently needed and a key spectrum allocation solu-
tion is to allow a secondary user (SU) to simultaneously
share a licensed spectrum with the primary link as long as
the interference from the secondary transmission does not
go beyond the tolerable threshold of the primary link [2].
Meanwhile, it is well known that the existing spectrum
allocation policies usually lead to inefficiency in spectrum
utilization. Hence, more effective spectrum allocation and
utilization schemes are required for next-generation
wireless networks. At the same time, spectrum auction
has been considered as a promising approach to effectively
reallocate spectrum resources. In order to effectively
tackle the co-channel interference between SUs and the
primary user (PU), fractional frequency reuse (FFR) has
been widely applied. On the other hand, as a quite promis-
ing interference suppression technique, joint precoding
and power allocation has been widely studied for CR
networks. It is thus quite natural to combine all these
above techniques to achieve higher spectral efficiency.
Auction has been widely applied to spectrum alloca-
tion recently and has obtained huge achievement. For
example, the authors in [3] indicated that dynamic
spectrum auction has been considered as a promising
approach to effectively reallocate spectrum resources in
the secondary spectrum market. Besides, a combinatorial
auction with flexible bidding formats was proposed in
[4] for the channel allocation problem in CR networks.
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Moreover, the current research works and literatures
have studied revenue maximization auction [5], truthful-
ness guaranty auction [6–8], flexible auction [9], and so
on. Spectrum auction has been widely discussed in litera-
ture [10, 11]. Besides, [12] included a cooperation-based
dynamic spectrum leasing mechanism via multi-winner
auction for multiple bands. The authors in [13] proposed
a scalable collusion-resistant multi-winner spectrum auc-
tion, in which the collusive behavior of selfish users was
carefully taken into consideration.
FFR, a recent emerged wireless network technology, is
an effective and promising approach to tackle interfer-
ence in cellular systems [14]. The main thoughts of FFR
are to divide the cell bandwidth into center and edge, so
that cell-edge users do not interfere with each other.
Furthermore, it can mitigate the interference to interior
users and the available spectrum utilization is more effi-
cient than other traditional frequency reuse methods.
The scholars in [15, 16] contributed to design optimal
FFR schemes, and they solved the interference coordin-
ation problem already. Referring to the FFR scheme, the
resources for cell-center and cell-edge users were parti-
tioned. Based on such resource planning, the objective
of the resource allocation scheme in [17] is to maximize
both cell-edge and cell-center users’ throughput, subject
to per base station power constraints. In this paper, we
use FFR to manage co-channel interference as well as
improve spectrum reusability.
Precoding schemes can be divided into two categories.
The first category of hybrid precoding was based on
spatially sparse precoding [18–20], which formulated the
achievable rate optimization problem as a sparse, ap-
proximation problem and solved it by the orthogonal
matching pursuit (OMP) algorithm to achieve near-
optimal performance. The second category of hybrid
precoding was based on codebooks [21–23], which in-
volved an iterative searching procedure among the pre-
defined codebooks to find the optimal hybrid precoding
matrix [24]. The author in [25] indicated that matched-
filter (MF) data precoding suffers from a large loss in
the achievable information rate compared to other linear
data precoders such as zero-forcing (ZF) and regularized
channel inversion (RCI) precoders as the number of mo-
bile terminals (MTs) increases. Power allocation is used
to maximize sum utility derived from a wireless network
operation to yield throughput optimal, fair, and energy-
efficient communications. Furthermore, precoding and
power control are two well-known approaches that can
mitigate co-channel interference (CCI) and thus enhance
the system capacity. Therefore, joint precoding and power
control has been widely studied for CR networks [2].
Aiming to find an efficient way to enhance the secrecy
rate with a tractable complexity, the author in [26] pro-
posed a suboptimal joint source and relay linear precoding
and power allocation scheme. In [27], the author investi-
gated the linear precoding and power allocation policies
to realize the optimal resource allocation for general
multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian chan-
nels with arbitrary input distributions, by capitalizing on
the relationship between mutual information and mini-
mum mean-square error (MMSE). Moreover, other joint
precoding and power control techniques have been widely
studied in different communication scenarios recently
[28–32]. However, none of them consider the sum utility
of SUs and the revenue of PUs together.
Stackelberg game, also known as leader-follower game,
is a special case of hierarchical decision-making problems
in which a distinguished agent, known as the leader,
makes the first move and this action is followed by the ac-
tions of the remaining agents (i.e., the followers). In a
Stackelberg game-based spectrum auction process, the PU
protects itself by pricing the interference of the secondary
link so as to maximize its own revenue. Then, the SUs for-
mulate their strategies through precoding and power allo-
cation based on this pricing to maximize their utility
function [33]. Besides, when it comes to the resource allo-
cation in CR networks, the Stackelberg game-based model
is widely preferred since it is able to reflect the features of
hierarchy and ad hoc topology in the network [34]. The
author in [35] proposed a two-stage spectrum sharing
scheme with combinatorial auction and Stackelberg game
in recall-based cognitive radio networks. In fact, choosing
a proper pricing mechanism with respect to different
utility functions can be an efficient way of determining
the equilibrium between the utility of SUs and the
revenue of PU.
In our earlier work [36], we have studied a spectrum
auction problem under the assumption that the bidding
and valuation of SUs take a random number in a certain
range. In fact, they are often related to the channel cap-
acity or channel quality (typically SINR). Therefore, we
make some corresponding improvements of it to design
a more effective spectrum auction algorithm. Besides,
given the excellent properties of all the above technolo-
gies, in this paper, through an optimal interference price
announced by the PU, a joint precoding and power allo-
cation algorithm via Stackelberg game (OIPPS) is pro-
posed to solve the spectrum auction problem subject to
the interference constraint of PU, the transmission
power constraint of SUs, and the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraint of each SU. The major
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
 Through the optimal interference price of the
PU, we propose a joint precoding and power
allocation algorithm in a FFR cognitive cellular
system to balance the revenue of PU and the
utility of SUs.
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 We study the secondary network utility
maximization problem through Stackelberg game,
and the revenue of PU is taken into account
simultaneously.
 We improve the bidding and valuation of spectrum
auction to improve the system performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we describe the system model. In Section 3,
the detailed optimization problem is introduced and
elaborated. The performance evaluation through numer-
ical simulations is presented in Section 4, and finally, the
conclusion is given in Section 5.
2 System model
We reference related researches to consider a two-tier
CR network with a single PU and K SUs. The primary
network consists of a primary base station (BS) that
transmits signals to a single PU. The secondary network
has a single femtocell base station, equipped with K an-
tennas, serving K SUs. Besides, the PU and the SUs
share the same band and each of them is scheduled to
serve one single user at each time interval, as shown in
Fig. 1, where Hk denotes the channel coefficient from
macro BS to user k, Hp denotes the channel coefficient
from macro BS to PU, gk denotes the channel coefficient
from femto BS to user k, and gp denotes the channel
coefficient from femto BS to PU. The PU is required
to keep the femtocell-to-macrocell interference to an
acceptable level. When it comes to multiple PUs, we can
expand this typical model into a large cellular network to
well represent a real situation. Through the usage of FFR,
the complex topology of a network can be divided into
several typical parts. So for simplicity, we just analyze one
of them, as shown in Fig. 2. Besides, we assume that all
the channels involved experience block fading and remain
constant during each transmission block.
Furthermore, due to the shortage of spectrum re-
sources, the SUs need to share spectrum resources with
the PU and the interference between them is inevitable.
Therefore, how to restrain and reduce the interference
effectively becomes an urgent problem. In our paper, a
FFR cognitive cellular system is considered where the
primary base station (PBS) and the PU locate at the center
of a cell while SUs are deployed at the center and edge, re-
spectively, as shown in Fig. 2. It can effectively mitigate
the interference to interior users created by cell-edge
users, and the available spectrum utilization is more ef-
ficient than other traditional frequency reuse methods.
Furthermore, FFR determines the distribution of the
spectrum frequency within a cell (i.e., the center of a
cell can use the same spectrum band while specific
edge users share the rest of the bands). For example,
three nonadjacent edge cells can use the same channel
while FFR is equal to 3. Therefore, different locations of
the SUs receive different interference conditions and
the interference they caused to the PU is also distinct.
Generally, a center SU can receive interference from
the PU and interference from other center SUs when
an edge SU can only receive interference information
from co-channel SUs [17].
Considering the interference constraints, SUs compete
for the available spectrum so as to satisfy their commu-
nication requirements. However, when a SU selfishly
chooses a strategy to increase its own utility, it may in-
crease the interference level of the PU and other SUs.
Therefore, the strategies chosen by different SUs depend
on each other. On the other hand, the PU and SUs all
want to maximize their interests during the spectrum
allocation process, which can be modeled as a Stackelberg
game [34]. Stackelberg game is a strategic game that con-
sists of a leader and several followers competing with each
other on certain resources. In this paper, we formulate the
PU as the leader and the SUs as the followers. The PU














Fig. 2 Interference model under FFR
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imposes a set of prices on per unit of received interference
power from each SU. Then, the SUs update their strat-
egies to maximize their individual utilities based on the
assigned interference prices. Furthermore, the quality of
service (QoS) and the revenue of PU have the highest pri-
ority to be maintained, which is severely affected by the
cross-tier interference. A joint precoding and power allo-
cation algorithm on the secondary networks is considered
as the most effective solution to adjust the power of SUs.
The details are as follows.
3 Problem formulation
In this section, we first present the Stackelberg game
model (i.e., giving full consideration of the revenue of
PU and the utility of SUs). Then, a joint precoding and
power allocation algorithm through an optimal interfer-
ence price is expounded in detail.
3.1 Revenue of PU
As the PU has sufficient frequency spectrum resources
to communicate with each other, the main purpose of
them is seeking the maximum revenue under the toler-
able interference, rather than improving the quality of
communication. However, due to greediness, each SU
only focuses on the increase of its own utility without
nulling the interference to the PU while sharing
spectrum resources with the PU. In order to suppress
the interference from SUs, the PU generally employs
interference price as an effective tool to optimize the
noncooperative game [34]. In fact, the interference price
is the bridge of primary and secondary networks. Gener-
ally, the interference price (i.e., ω) is distinct for different
SUs; we assume that ωk is the asking price to SUk and
the maximum interference that the PU can tolerate is
Ith. Besides, the revenue of PU consists of interference
from SUs and the corresponding interference reward
(i.e., interference price) [34] and our objective is to
maximize the revenue of PU under the tolerable interfer-










where Up is the revenue of PU, Ik is the interference re-
ceived from user k, it is a function of precoding vector
and transmission power vector, with Ik = pk|Hpfk|
2, and
ωk, pk, and fk are interference price, transmission power
vector, and precoding vector of user k, respectively. Hp is
a (M × 1) vector representing the channel between the
primary base station and PU.
3.2 Sum utility of SUs
Different from the PU, the goal of SUs is to maximize
their own utility on the premise of spectrum resource
sharing, so they need to get more spectrum bands to im-
prove QoS of their communication regardless of the inter-
ference caused to the PU. Considering the principle of
communication of the PU and SUs, next, we will analyze
the sum utility optimization problem. Before that, we give
the correlation definition firstly.
Under the FFR model, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the dis-
tribution of SUs in different locations in a cell deter-
mines the interference to the PU. That is to say, FFR
divides the cell bandwidth into center and edges so that
cell-edge users do not interfere with each other, so we
discuss it in two different conditions. In fact, a center
SU can receive interference from the PU and interfer-
ence from other center SUs while an edge SU can only
accept interference information from co-channel SUs,
as illustrated in [17, 37]. Firstly, we assume that SUs lo-
cate at the center of the cell. Then, a cell-edge situation
is given.
3.2.1 Cell-center SUs
For cell-center SUs, we assume that the number of SUs
is K and their communication interference comes from
co-channel SUs except itself and co-channel PU as well
as the additive complex Gaussian noise. According to
the MIMO CR system in Fig. 1 and the FFR condition
in Fig. 2, we can get the received SINR of cell-center
SUk [2, 17]:




Hk f ij j2pi þ gk
 2pp þ σ2
ð2Þ
where K is the number of SUs; ωk, pk, and fk are interfer-
ence price, transmission power vector, and precoding
vector of user k, respectively; Hk is a (M × 1) vector
representing the channel coefficients between the pri-
mary base station and SUs, which is assumed to be zero-
mean unit-variance circularly symmetric complex Gauss-
ian random variables;
XK
i¼1;i≠k Hk f ij j
2pi represents the
interference from other SUs to user k; |gk|
2pp denotes the
interference from the primary node to SUk; and the
additive noise is assumed to be complex Gaussian,
with zero mean and variance σ2. It is assumed that
the channel coefficients can be simultaneously estimated
with the deep sensing paradigm.
The sum utility function of each SU consists of two
parts: profit and cost. With the increase of the transmit
power of SUs, the SUs will definitely cause more inter-
ference to the PU, so the PU will increase interference
price to balance this loss. As a result, it has to buy more
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interference quota from the PU, which increases the
cost. In order to prevent the selfish behavior above, the
payoff function should consist of revenue and cost,
which can be formally stated as follows:
UC ¼ λk log2 1þ SINRkð Þ−ωkIk
¼ λk log2 1þ SINRkð Þ−ωkpk Hpf k
 2 ð3Þ
where λk is the utility gain per unit transmission rate for
user k; UC is the sum utility of all center SUs; Ik is the
interference received from user k, it is a function of
precoding vector and transmission power vector, with
Ik = pk|Hpfk|
2, which is the difference of utility revenue
and cost; and Ik is the interference it causes to the PU.
Similarly, our objective is to consider joint optimization
of the precoding and power allocation to maximize UC as
well as Up when SUs are distributed in the cell center,
which can be simplified as
















where the first constraint restricting the interference
power from SUs to the PU should be less than Ith. The
second constraint is to guarantee the total transmission
power of SUs is bounded by a certain limit pmax, and
the third constraint ensures the SINR requirement for
each SU.
3.2.2 Cell-edge SUs
For cell-edge SUs, FFR can suppress co-channel interfer-
ence, as illustrated in Fig. 2. We assume that the number
of SUs is K. Their communication interference only
comes from the additive complex Gaussian noise [17, 37].
So, the received SINR at cell-edge SUk is




The sum throughput of SUs also includes two parts:
revenue and cost. Utility is the difference of them, which
can be written as
UE ¼ λk log2 1þ SINRkð Þ−ωkIk
¼ λk log2 1þ SINRkð Þ−ωkpk Hpf k
 2 ð6Þ
where λk is the utility gain per unit transmission rate for
user k; UE is the sum utility of all edge SUs, which is the
difference of utility revenue and cost; and Ik is the
interference it causes to the PU. Similarly, our objective
is to consider joint optimization of the precoding and
power allocation to maximize UE as well as Up, which
can be simplified as
















where the first constraint restricting the interference
power from SUs to the PU should be less than Ith. The
second constraint is to guarantee the total transmission
power of SUs is bounded by a certain limit pmax, and
the third constraint ensures the SINR requirement for
each SU.
3.3 Nash equilibrium
In the process of precoding and power allocation, every
player is unilaterally optimal and no player can increase
its utility alone by changing its own strategy (i.e., a
SU selfishly chooses a strategy to increase its own
utility, it may increase the interference of other SUs
[2]). This is a Stackelberg game, and the achievement
of a Nash equilibrium (NE) is a well-known optimality cri-
terion to analyze the outcome of the Stackelberg game.
Therefore, the strategies chosen by different SUs depend
on each other and an equilibrium between SUs’ utility and
the PU’s revenue is achieved at NE point. The specific
proof is shown as follows.
For the cell-center SUk, assuming that the precoding
vector is fixed, by taking the first and second derivative







Hk f ij j2pi þ gk








Hk f kj j4XK
i¼1;i≠k
Hk f ij j2pi þ gk
 2pp þ σ2 þ pk f kHkj j2
 !2
ð9Þ
Similarly, when the transmission power vector is fixed,
by taking the first and second derivative of the utility
function with respect to |fk|
2, we have
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∂UC





Hk f ij j2pi þ gk





∂2 f kj j2
¼ − λk
ln2
pkð Þ2 Hkj j4XK
i¼1;i≠k
Hk f ij j2pi þ gk




4 ≥ 0, pk
2|Hk|





∂2 f kj j2
≤0.
Consequently, the utility functions of SUs satisfy all
the required conditions and there exists at least one NE
of these utility functions.
In the same way, we can get demonstrates when SUs
distribute on the edge of the cell. For each SU, assuming
that the precoding vector is fixed, by taking the first and






Hk f kj j2







Hk f kj j4
σ2 þ pk f kHkj j2ð Þ2
≤0 ð13Þ
Similarly, when the transmission power vector is fixed,
by taking the first and second derivative of the utility
function with respect to |fk|
2, we have
∂UE













σ2 þ pk f kHkj j2
 2 ≤0 ð15Þ
So, there still exists at least one NE. Therefore, we can
say that there always exists a NE.
3.4 Precoding and power allocation algorithm
In this section, we propose an iterative algorithm that
repeats the precoding and power allocation steps until a
locally optimal pair of precoding and transmission power
vectors is achieved. In order to fully analyze our optimal
problem within all the location distribution of SUs, we
next discuss it in two different conditions (i.e., cell-center
and cell-edge SUs), respectively.
3.4.1 Cell-center SUs
For the joint precoding and power allocation problem,
we firstly expound the precoding problem and power
allocation problem, respectively. Then, a joint algorithm
is proposed to get the optimal precoding and transmis-
sion power vectors.
(1)Power allocation algorithm
Precoding and power allocation are performed at the
cognitive base station to maximize the throughput
of the secondary network. First of all, we fix the
precoding vectors f to realize the optimization
problem through the power vector p. Clearly, this is
a concave optimization problem [34] and the
optimal solution cannot be reached by individual
choice of transmit power pk by each user, since each
SINR is affected through the interference terms by
the entire transmission power vector.
To find the optimal transmission power vector
under the goal of achieving the maximum system
utility, we need to get the optimal interference price
firstly. So, the revenue of PU described in (1) is our
first target to solve. It is observed that problem (1) is
a concave function over pk. For a convex optimization
problem, the optimal solution must satisfy the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. So, by
solving the KKT conditions, the optimal solution
for (1) is easy to obtain. For a given interference
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By substituting (16) into (1), the optimization








Hk f ij j2pi þ gk


















Hk f ij j2pi þ gk




Furthermore, by solving the KKT conditions, we can
get the optimal interference price ωk* and optimal
power vector pk* while guaranteeing the revenue of
PU maximum, as follows:














Hk f ij j2pi þ gk
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Next, assume that the transmit power vector p is
fixed, so that the maximization of problem (4) is
carried out only over the precoding vector f. For
each user k, we compute the precoding vector; these
are generalized eigenvalue problems as
f k









Hk f ij j2pi þ gk
 2pp þ σ2
 !
I.
(3)Joint precoding and power allocation algorithm
To search the maximum of problem (4) with respect
to both precoding and transmission power vectors,
through an optimal interference price announced by
the PU, a joint precoding and power allocation
algorithm via Stackelberg game (OIPPS) is designed
to solve the spectrum auction problem. The OIPPS
algorithm consists of three parts: First, the power
control part runs for a certain iteration to obtain an
initial optimization expression pk by using some
initial precoding matrix and computes a power
vector which may not be optimal because the
algorithm stops without necessarily converging.
Next, use this optimal transmission power vector to
find the optimal interference price ωk*. Then,
substitute ωk with ωk* to obtain pk* and fk*. This
process of power control and precoding steps
are repeated, until convergence is achieved to a
locally optimal pair of precoding and transmission
power vectors. The OIPPS algorithm is elaborated
in Algorithm 1.
3.4.2 Cell-edge SUs
For the cell-edge SUs, they have similar precoding and
power allocation process as center SUs. Next, we will
introduce it briefly. We firstly expound the precoding
problem and power allocation problem, respectively.
Then, a joint algorithm is proposed to get the optimal
precoding and transmission power vectors.
(1)Power allocation algorithm
For a given interference price ωk, by solving the










By substituting (16) into (1), the optimization






















Furthermore, by solving the KKT conditions, we can
get the optimal interference price ωk* and optimal
power vector pk* while guaranteeing the revenue of






























Next, assume that the transmit power vector p is
fixed, so that the maximization of problem (7) is
carried out only over the precoding vector f. For
each user k, we compute the precoding vector; these
are generalized eigenvalue problems as
f k








(3)Joint precoding and power allocation algorithm
For cell-edge SUs, our proposed OIPPS algorithm
also consists of three parts: First, the power control
part runs for a certain iterations to obtain an initial
optimization expression pk using some initial
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precoding matrix and computes a transmission
power vector which may not be optimal because the
algorithm stops without necessarily converging.
Next, use this optimal transmission power vector to
find the optimal interference price ωk*. Then, substi-
tute ωk with ωk* to obtain pk* and fk*. This process
of power control and precoding steps are repeated,
until convergence is achieved to a locally optimal
pair of precoding and transmission power vectors.
The OIPPS algorithm for edge SUs is elaborated in
Algorithm 2.
4 Simulation results
In this section, we provide numerical results to show the
convergence properties of the proposed OIPPS algorithm.
In order to reflect the superiority of our proposed algo-
rithm, we make comparisons with the algorithm proposed
in [2]. Besides, a classical waterfilling algorithm is used to
compare with the power allocation method.
4.1 Simulation setup
For simplicity, we suppose that there are a single PU
and four SUs, which are distributed in a three-cell model
(i.e., two of them are located at the center of the cell and
another two distributed on the edge) and the FFR is equal
to 3. In the following results, we choose the noise power
σ2 = 3e − 3 W, the PU transmission power pp = 0.1 W, the
SU’s maximum transmission power pmax = 10 W, the
interference threshold Ith = 100, λk = 1, B = 1, and each
minimum SINR constraint of SU is γmin = 5 dB. Further-
more, the channel coefficients between the primary base
station and SUs are assumed to be zero-mean unit-
variance circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables and as a common practice of many researchers,
the MATLAB tool is used to generate the random channel
coefficients. The related simulation setup follows the ref-
erence values in [2, 17, 34].
4.2 Performance evaluation
Figure 3 illustrates the total revenue of PU by sharing
spectrum resources with all four SUs in our proposed al-
gorithm. We can see that PU’s revenue obtains a stable
maximum value when the curve converges after several
iterations. That is to say, our proposed OIPPS with opti-
mal price well coordinates the interference and gains be-
tween PU and SUs. The Stackelberg game achieves a NE
between the revenue of PU and the sum utility of SUs at
the ninth iteration.
In Fig. 4, we draw the sum utility tendency comparison
between our proposed OIPPS and the fixed price method
in [2]. It is obvious that the sum utility of SUs is dramatic-
ally improved by adopting OIPPS with optimal price and
it converges to a fixed value. Besides, a NE is reached in
this game while the sum utility converges. That is because
the OIPPS with optimal price successfully contributes to
the win-win situation of PU’s revenue maximization and
SUs’ utility maximization. Therefore, the Stackelberg game













Fig. 3 Revenue of PU
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with a flexible price design successfully contributes to the
improvement of gains when compared with the fixed price
method in [2].
As observed from Fig. 5, we make a sum utility com-
parison between SUs under classical spectrum auction in
our previous work [36] and the bidding improving algo-
rithm by OIPPS auction. We can see that the utility of
SUs through the improved auction proposed is higher
than the original bidding auction. The reason is that clas-
sical auction-based method in [36] introduced a random
value in a certain scope as the bidding of SUs and this
choice cannot well represent the real auction situation, so
the efficiency and sum utility of the auction is low. In
order to improve the system performance in our earlier
work [36], in this paper, we use the precoding and power
allocation method to analyze the SINR of received signals.
Furthermore, we add SINR as well as bandwidth into an
improved bidding expression and this new scheme can
well reflect a real competition mechanism, so greater gains
can be obtained than the classical one.
Figure 6 depicts the precoding weights allocated for
each secondary link when the initialization of precoding
weights is set to be 1 and the power allocation is fixed to
the same value. We can see that all transmit precoding
vector converges to the optimal levels. In addition, our
proposed OIPPS with optimal price has a more stable
















OIPPS with optimal price
fixed price in [2]
Fig. 4 Sum utility comparison

















Fig. 5 Sum utility under auction and OIPPS + auction
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convergence than the fixed price scheme in [2]. Similar to
the sum utility, we can observe that both OIPPS and the
fixed price method are effective precoding scheme.
As illustrated in Fig. 7, the description of power alloca-
tion situations are given specifically. In order to show
the effectiveness of OIPPS, we make a comparison with
the classical waterfilling algorithm. We can see that the
two power allocation algorithms can effectively realize
spectrum allocation under the peak power restriction.
Furthermore, through the comparison of power alloca-
tion results between OIPPS and the classical waterfilling
method, we can see that our proposed OIPPS has a
higher power level and faster speed of convergence. The
higher the transmission power, the stronger the signal
strength at the receiver. Under the same condition, the
higher the power level, the better the communication qual-
ity of SUs. So, we can conclude that our proposed OIPPS
has better performance than the classical waterfilling.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, through an optimal interference price an-
nounced by the primary user (PU), we have proposed a
joint precoding and power allocation algorithm via
Stackelberg game (OIPPS) for a FFR cognitive radio
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cellular system to improve our earlier spectrum auc-
tion work. Based on the optimal interference price,
SUs compute their optimal precoding and power vec-
tors in a distributed manner to maximize their utilities
under the transmission power constraint of SUs, inter-
ference constraint of PUs, and SINR constraint of each
SU while giving full consideration of the PU’s revenue.
Furthermore, we have improved the previous bidding
strategies to achieve a higher spectrum auction effi-
ciency. Simulation results indicate that the proposed pre-
coding and power allocation algorithm via Stackelberg
game in the FFR cognitive cellular system can achieve a
win-win situation between PU and SUs (i.e., it can not
only suppress the interference of PU but also achieve a
higher system utility of SUs).
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